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Abstract: The paper focuses on a labour market  dominated by a public sector where the links
between pay and effort are weak, as in many developing countries. This feature is incorporated
in an extension of the basic Shapiro-Stiglitz model of shirking in order to explain the co-
existence of high wages (in both private and public sectors)  and high unemployment. Using data
from  panel surveys of households and of manufacturing firms, the empirical test attempts to
identify why firms in the private sector do not bid down wages but offer a  premium over the
reservation wage of the marginal worker.  The robustness of the premium is tested by controlling
for the heterogeneity of workers, and the dispersion in wage offers and  reservation wages of
workers relative to the marginal worker.  The premium appears to be driven by efficiency wage
considerations rather than alternatives such as bargaining models and specific investments in
workers.
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1. Introduction
The consensus on why wage levels in urban labour markets are often high is that it reflects
government wage policy, which in many countries sets urban wages at an artificially high level.
In some countries and in some periods, trade unions might play a role - but the blame for “too
high” wages is usually firmly assigned to public sector hiring and wage policies combined with
urban bias in pricing of basic consumption goods, that inflate wages well above productivity and
labour costs.
However, there is little reason to believe that government pay policies by themselves should have
any direct effect on wage determination in a competitive private sector, in the absence of attempts
to overtly influence private sector pay.   Of course, government employment policy might crowd
out particular categories of skilled labour and hence affect wage-setting for such workers.  In fact,
as long labour demand in the private sector is determined by the value of marginal product, the
effect of government pay policies is to affect the supply of labour to the private sector.  There is
no reason, however, in these circumstances,  to believe that the private sector will pay a premium
over the reservation wage of the marginal worker, even if the public sector does do so (see
Lindauer, 1991).  Therefore, if the private sector is observed paying a premium over the
reservation wage in the absence of trade union or overt government pressure, an alternative
explanation for the payment of premiums must be offered. This paper focuses on the case of
Ethiopia which has a dominant public sector offering relatively high levels of pay (Taye, 1998,
1999). The private sector in Ethiopia is still rather small in comparison, but there is little
evidence that it is over-regulated or that pressure is applied to keep wages high.  Nevertheless,
the descriptive statistics indicate that despite rates of unemployment as high as 30% and a period
of inflation, real wages in the private sector did not budge and were significantly above reported
reservation wages.  In the circumstances, the existence of such premiums deserve investigation.
Why might wage premiums be observed in the private sector? In the absence of regulation or
union pressure on wages, there are a number of different models consistent with the existence
of such premiums.  First, in a standard competitive model, wage premiums are likely to be
observed if workers differ in their reservation wages or in ability (observable only to the
employer), thus creating dispersion in the offered wage.  In any empirical analysis, introducing
controls for such differences should therefore eliminate evidence of a premium.  The relatively
higher risk aversion of workers might also induce premiums, if firms keep wages stable despite
changing labour market conditions in order to protect workers against fluctuations in income.
Alternative models of wage determination that rely on the bargaining power of workers or the
threat of union formation would also predict wage premiums. The existence of specific
investments and turnover costs might afford rents to continuing in employment and might be the
object of a bargain between employer and employee (Malcolmson, 1999). In such circumstances,
rents should only  be available to those with some experience on the job - first-time workers
should not receive them. (This is also likely to be true for search and matching models that
assume that it is costly to search and obtain the best employer-employee match since, if matches
can only be assessed after a period, first-time workers are unlikely to be rewarded in advance.)
The previous models are concerned mainly with recruitment and retention of workers.  Models
concerned with the motivation of workers to exert themselves on the job also predict premiums2The public sector remains the largest urban employer in most African countries even if its importance
has diminished over the last decade: African central governments employed about 1.1% of the population in the
1990s compared with over 1.8% in the 1980s. However, less than 20% of the population is urban, so this means
a larger share as a percentage of the urban labour force. The fiscal weight of the central government wage bill
is one of the highest for Sub-Saharan Africa at 6.7% of GDP compared to 5.4% worldwide.  When measured
as a multiple of per-capita GDP, the wage is 5.7 times per-capita GDP . (see Stevenson (1992) and Schiavo-
Campo et al (1997)).
3Unemployment rates have remained high over the last decade.  The reforms of the economy undertaken
since a new government took power in 1992 have had little effect on unemployment.  Some of this persistence
in unemployment might be attributed to the fact that the private sector (and self-employment) were repressed
under the previous government of the Derg and the main source of employment lay in the public sector.It is
unlikely that the high rates of unemployment are caused by in-migration for Ethiopia has one of the lowest rates
of rural-urban migration in Africa; in part, due to the land reforms undertaken in rural areas and the fact that
there are only user rights in land, so that migration would mean abandoning the claim to land. 
2
but for different reasons. Models of efficiency wages such as that of  Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
predict that firms are likely to pay a premium over the reservation wage since they are unable to
verify effort on the job without costly monitoring.  Workers exert effort since if they do not and
are found out, will lose that premium.  The existence of wage premiums above the reservation
wage of the marginal worker also implies that the labour market does not clear and the
consequent unemployment acts to discipline workers.  Other models of efficiency wages such
as Akerlof’s gift-exchange model (1982) provides a justification for wage premiums by
hypothesising that a rise in relative wages results in workers reciprocating with increased effort
if wage premiums engender loyalty and gratitude.
While there are many explanations for the existence of wage premiums, explaining persistently
high rates of unemployment together with unyieldingly high levels of wages is more difficult.
Arguably, explanations based on efficiency wage payments offer a coherent and persuasive
account of why this might be so. In particular, they may matter in labour markets dominated by
a large public sector
2, where there is more than a suspicion that with a relatively large, rather
inefficient public sector, the link between effort and pay (in wages or in other forms of rewards,
such as privileges) is weak, which may affect private sector labour market functioning. Of course,
while a large public sector might be unable to monitor the effort of its employees, it does not
follow that the private sector must be similarly afflicted - but it is plausible that the problem of
shirking might be infectious.  In what follows, I lay out  a standard market-clearing model of
labour allocation, extended to account for a public sector where wages are set institutionally and
a private sector where wage premiums are driven by the inability of employers to observe effort
as in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model of shirking. This is contrasted with a simple model of rent-
sharing where wages are determined by some bargain between workers and employers.  
I use data on a sample of urban households in Ethiopia, surveyed twice in 1994 and 1997.  The
high rates of unemployment observed here
3 need not necessarily suggest that the private sector
pays a wage premium or that unemployment is largely involuntary.  In particular, the hiring
policies of the public sector until 1992 might have served to increase `wait` unemployment:
hiring was largely from the ranks of the unemployed.  Over 80% of the unemployed claim to be
supported by their family - only 15% admit taking up an occasional job in order to support
themselves.  This would suggest that they are able to endure some length of time in
unemployment, while queueing for work.  It also sits comfortably in a world where graduates of
tertiary education were guaranteed employment in the public sector and secondary-school leavers4I assume that other factor markets clear, or more simply, abstract from problems in labour demand
caused by spillovers from other factor markets. This may be a strong assumption: investment in private sector
activities appears very slow and sluggish, despite recent measures to improve incentives to invest with structural
adjustment. However, given  non-convexities in production possibilities, private sector labour market adjustment
may be too slow to absorb the increased number of unemployed in particular skill categories, resulting in  high
levels of involuntary unemployment.
5Manning and Thomas (1997), point out that most of the tests thus far are unpersuasive precisely
because it is difficult to discriminate between efficiency wage explanations and alternatives such as rent-sharing
or competitive compensating wage differential models.  They also argue that there are few direct tests of
efiiciency wage models and most tests seem to suggest that incentives matter in wage setting but not much more.
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given some assurance that work would eventually be found for them.  However, this policy was
dramatically changed in 1993 when the new government undertook a programme of structural
adjustment - and expectations about employment ought to have changed with it.   One would
expect the unemployed to enter some form of informal employment (as in other developing
countries) in such circumstances. However, recent evidence (both anecdotal and derived from
urban surveys and the Census), suggests that petty self-employment is increasing but the
unemployed do not appear to be taking this up: the new entrants into this sector are mainly
students and housewives.  In a country that is one of the poorest in the world and where the
incentives to finding some work (even in relatively better-off households) would appear to be
strong, it is odd to see such high rates of urban unemployment. It is also inconsonant with wages
in the private sector being maintained at par with public sector wages - one would expect wages
in the private sector to be bid down by the unemployed.
In what follows, I allow that unemployment might still be motivated by expectations of
employment in the public sector, compounded by the inability (or reluctance) of the unemployed
to enter informal or self-employment. Wage premiums in the private sector labour market will
in part explain high unemployment without ruling out other explanations
4 - and in what follows
I explore the reasons for the existence of such premiums. It ought to be noted immediately that
the test is weighted against finding evidence of a premium: if the high  urban unemployment is
caused mainly by a combination of queueing for public sector work and the inability to enter
informal employment, it ought to be a sufficiently stern disciplining device and there should be
little reason for the private sector to pay a premium.
The empirical  approach taken here differs from other empirical tests in that it focuses primarily
on data on households rather than on firms.  Data on firms has always seemed the more natural
testing ground; however, the tests are bedevilled by the problem of distinguishing whether more
profitable firms pay their employees high wages as a form of rent-sharing or whether more
productive workers, who are paid to exert themselves, raise the profits of 
5firms.  However, the
test on household-level data is backed up by data using a sample of 220 private and public firms
in the manufacturing sector.  Firms were surveyed over the same period, 1994 and 1995 and were
asked about the manner in which they attempted to encourage effort from workers.  There is also
evidence from a survey of workers in each firm surveyed. I deploy evidence from both firms and
households in order to investigate the determinants of wage determination in the private sector.
The next section provides the theoretical framework used to organise the empirical tests followed
by a summary of the data in Section 3. Section 4 sets out the econometric model and the results.
Section 5 concludes the paper.6Typically, further assumptions are made on the nature of offer distribution. In particular, it is usually
assumed that offers are received according to a Poission process (Devine and Kiefer, 1996). This assumption
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2.  Unemployment and job allocation
I describe a model of labour force allocation, taking into account the existence of a public sector
that pegs wages at a relatively high level, while the private sector offers market wages. I model
this in two stages, in order to make explicit the difference in empirical prediction of a standard
market clearing model of wage determination and that in which a wage premium is offered. The
model is based on that of Boadway et al (1990).
The simple model of allocation describes a world in which offers of employment are made to the
unemployed and those engaged in job search while in the private sector. This is extended to
account for the possibility that the private sector pays an efficiency wage to encourage workers
to exert themselves on the job - and the predictions here are compared with that of a simple rent-
sharing model.  I assume that public sector workers do not look for other employment.  As will
be demonstrated in the next section where the aspirations of the unemployed are described, this
is consonant with behaviour in the labour market in Ethiopia.
To model the problem at hand, I begin by describing a traditional model of job allocation, with
three sectors: a private sector employing L1 workers and a public sector employing L2 workers
and the remainder unemployed out of a labour force N. The workers are assumed to be identical
as are the firms in the private sector. The model is set in continuous time, denoted by t.
Instantaneous utility is assumed linear in income, i.e. u(y(t))=y(t). I assume that the worker seeks
to maximize the expected present value of instantaneous utility, discounted over an infinite
horizon, at a rate r, i.e. 
Income y can be derived from different sources. Individuals receive an income of b while
unemployed. Job offers in each sector i, are denoted by the wage rate, wi, i = 1,2,; where sector
1 is the private sector and sector 2 the public sector.  Offers arrive with constant probability in
each period
6. 
The model describes the situation of the unemployed in an unchanging environment. Job offers
arrive at the rate of Π1 from the private sector and Π2 from the public sector while those in the
private sector receive offers from the public sector at rate Πp. Workers also leave work for
unemployment at an exogenously given rate of q1 for private sector workers and q2 for public
sector workers.  To derive optimal solutions to the decision problem for being in each sector,
consider the present values over a short interval of time [0,t]. Let VU, V1, and V2 denote
respectively, the present value of someone currently unemployed, a private sector worker and a
public sector worker. Since exp(-rt).1 - rt and since over this interval there is a probability q1t
(q2t) that private (public) sector workers would lose their jobs, it follows that:7The possibility of self-employment could be introduced in a simple fashion by assuming that the
unemployed can always take up self-employment - and will do so if the expected lifetime utility V3 of being self-
employed is higher than Vu but this will not affect the analysis here. However, given that entry into self-employment
might be determined by quite different considerations from that of wage work, and that the data reveal that that there
is no movement between self-employment and wage-work, I confine myself to examining the behaviour of those
looking for wage work.
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V1 ' w1t % (1&rt)[q1tVU% (1&q1t&Πpt)V1%ΠptV2] (2)
VU ' bt % (1&rt)[Π1tV1 % Π2tV2 % (1&Π1t&Π2t)VU] (4)
V2 ' w2t % (1&rt)[q2tVU% (1&q2t)V2] (3)
rV1 ' w1 % q1(VU & V1) % Πp(V2&V1) (5)
rV2 ' w2 % q2(VU & V2) (6)
Note that (4) assumes that workers take the first job offered (as in Boadway et al. (1990)). This
follows if the expected lifetime utility Vu above is larger than that gained from accepting jobs
only in either the public or private sectors
7.  Note also that (4) assumes that only worthwhile
offers are given to the unemployed (or alternatively, are used in their valuation). Taking VU  as
given and taking limits as t 6 0, equations (2), (3), (4)  for V1, V2  and VU are solved as:6











These equations can be interpreted as asset equilibrium equations: the return from being in a
particular state (‘the interest rate times the asset’) equals the income earned from the state in each
t and the expected capital gain or loss. They must be valid for each individual.
Workers are only observed in jobs if it is worth their while and so the participation constraint has
to be satisfied. This means that for someone observed working,V1 $ VU (private sector) or V2 $
VU (public sector) has to hold.   I treat b, and w2  as given and assume that the private sector
labour market clears. Consequently, equilibrium in the private sector labour market will imply
that for the (marginal) worker V1 = VU.  Equilibrium wages w1 can then be obtained as follows.
First, solving (5), (6) and (7) for VU, and then substituting this in (5), the following expression
is easily obtained.
In short, the equilibrium wage in the private sector must be equal to the discounted value
of income while unemployed and the discounted expected value of the government´s wage offer,
where the discount takes into account the probability of obtaining wage offers in the government
sector.  If the government were to pay reservation wages, so would the private sector.  The private
sector´s wages are distorted to the extent that the government pegs wages above the level of
discounted income available to the unemployed i.e. b. The last term is the discounted value of
the excess of government pay over unemployment benefit, multiplied by the probability of getting
a government job offer while in the private sector. In fact, if public sector wages are pegged at
very high levels and accession rates into this sector are high (so that expected returns to being in
private employment are high), firms might even charge the unemployed a fee rather than pay a
wage.
Efficiency wages in the private sector
I now extend the model by introducing the possibility of workers in the private sector shirking
on the job.  Private sector workers are now assumed to be able to shirk on the job; the presence
of a large public sector in which employees are well paid and in which efficiency is not of prime
concern to employers may affect the motivation of workers in the private sector. Workers might
choose to shirk on the job  and private sector employers will wish to prevent them from doing
so. I assume that monitoring by employers is imperfect so another mechanism will have to be
used by employers as well. Workers can choose to shirk or not. Let superscript S (N) denote that7
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a worker is shirking (not-shirking). Let mp be the probability of losing the job through monitoring
of shirking by the firm. To introduce the consequences of expending effort (or not) on utility,
utility is assumed to be linear in wages and effort, u(w,e)=w-e. Effort expended in the public
sector by workers is the same as that of a worker who shirks in the private sector and set at zero
for simplicity (i.e. their productivity is zero). The ‘asset equilibrium’ equations for a worker when
shirking or  not shirking in the private sector can then be written as: 
Given that if the worker shirks, his productivity is zero, the firm will try to ensure that non-
shirking behaviour is the norm, i.e.
so that the value to the worker of not shirking is not lower than shirking. Using (9) and (10), (11)
implies that:
If the non-shirking condition (12) is satisfied, workers will not shirk on the job.The ‘asset
equilibrium’ equations for public sector employment and unemployment are given by (6) and (7)
as before.
The non-shirking condition (12) has important consequences. In equilibrium, firms will pay
wages that just induce workers never to shirk. Assuming that a worker indifferent between
shirking and non-shirking chooses not to shirk, (12) can be restated using the ‘asset equilibrium’
conditions for V2 and VU as before, to derive the optimal wage policy of firms. In the constrained
private sector labour market equilibrium, wages will then satisfy:
Comparing this solution with (8), the equilibrium wage condition without the non-shirking
condition, it is now clear that the wage offered will be higher than the equivalent wage in the
previous models - it exceeds it by the last term in the equation above. The premium paid will be
increasing by the extra effort e needed in the private sector, the rate of public sector job offers to8The rates, Π1 and Π2, can be related to the unemployment rate and to levels of employment L1 and L2 in
a steady state equilibrium.  In the steady state, flows into unemployment must equal flows into employment in the
different sectors.  This is turn, allows us to examine the response of the premium to the unemployment rate and it
is easy to show that the premium varies inversely with the unemployment rate, rises with increased employment in
the private sector and falls with rising employment in the public sector.
8









r(r%Πp%q2)θ % Πpq2(θ&1) % q1(r%q2)(θ&1)
r(r%Π2%q2) & Π1(r%q1)(θ&1)
(16)
workers in the private sector (Πp), the exogenous quit rate in the private sector q1 and the
(exogenous) rate at which unemployed get private sector job offers (Π1) ; it decreases with better
monitoring technology, which increases the shirking detection rate (mp) and with the rate of job
offers for the public sector to the unemployed (Π2)
8.  
However, while offering clear and testable predictions, the model is difficult to test, for the
predictions cannot be distinguished from those of alternative models.  To see this, the case of
bargaining over wages by workers and employers is presented below.
Wages in private sector set by bargaining between employers and workers
Suppose, instead of the firm setting an efficient wage as above, wages and effort are determined
by a bargain between employer and employee.  In order to avoid being pinned to a specific model
(which is unlikely to be amenable to an empirical test), the basic prediction of any such model,
that V1 is above reservation utility Vu is used, (see Machin and Manning (1992)).  It is assumed
that
where θ >1,  is assumed to be constant, (though it might well be a function of exogenous
variables that determine bargaining power).  If so, the following expression for private sector
wages in equilibrium can be derived as before:
where A is larger than 1. Note that if θ=1, (17) reduces to (8).
The contrast between (8) on the one hand and (13) and (15) on the other forms the basis of the
test proposed here: if firms pay efficiency wages (or share rents), the distribution of accepted
wages will be truncated below, not by the reservation wage alone (as in a standard job allocation
model), but by the reservation wage plus a premium.   Furthermore, in the case of the shirking
model, the premium is higher, the greater the exogenous quit rate from the private sector, the
higher the rate of accession into the public sector from the private sector, the worse the ability9
of the firm to monitor its workers and the higher the likelihood of the unemployed getting into
the private sector. The bargaining model suggests that the premium is higher, the greater the
exogenous quit rate from the private sector, the higher the rate of accession into the public sector
from the private sector and the  higher the likelihood of the unemployed getting into the private
sector but the most important factor is the size of θ and whether it is substantially different from
1.  Hence, in the absence of specific information about monitoring technologies or the factors
driving the bargain, both kinds of models offer similar predictions of a premium over the
reservation wage and an empirical test that finds evidence of a premium is unlikely to be able to
come out strongly in favour of the one over the other.  
The challenge is therefore to discover other proximate evidence that might persuasively
distinguish these theories in the empirical analysis.  The next section discusses the data available
to do so and possible ways in which these theories can be distinguished.  In particular, a
combination of data on firms and households is to be deployed in order to both offer different
perspectives on the evidence in favour of the various possibilities and more important, assess the
consistency of the evidence.
3.  The empirical tests and the data
Using household data on premiums
There are two possible approaches to distinguishing between the various models of wage
determination.  As the previous section demonstrated, the existence of premiums alone cannot
do so - but a detailed examination of the data might do better.  The first step is to establish that
wage premiums actually exist and are not driven by heterogeneity in the labour market. If wage
premiums do not disappear once controls for worker and firm heterogeneity are introduced (by
using fixed effects estimation), the next step is to ask what might cause them.  The primary
distinction is between efficiency wage models and models where wages are determined by insider
effects.  If insider effects are because of specific investments in workers which allow workers to
bargain over the rents available thus, a possible test is to check whether new and first-time
workers receive the wage premiums. If they do, this is inconsistent with such effects for they are
generated to those continuing in work (Malcolmson, 1999).  If union effects matter, comparing
workers in union and non-union firms should allow the effects to be distinguished (but this is
unhelpful if the threat of union formation drives the sharing of rents).  
Efficiency wage models ought to generate premiums to all workers but might also generate
different premiums by occupational or education group as in the shirking model discussed earlier
if unemployment rates differ across groups or types of workers - and ought to be responsive to
movement in unemployment rates over time. A difficulty with using data on households is the
paucity of controls available for the match between employer and employee.  The only data
available are controls for firm-size, occupation and sector - but given such controls, if wage
premiums persist and are determined primarily by worker type, the argument must be on the side
of efficiency wages.  However, the main prediction of this class of models is that firms offer
wages above the going rate because it raises productivity and this is  not readily testable using
household-level data and so I turn now to a discussion of what might be achieved by examining
data on the firm.9Data collection was done in collaboration with the University of Goteborg and financed by SAREC
(SIDA), Sweden.
10The number of observations in 1997 is slightly smaller, in part due to missing information or responses
for some members of the household and in part due to attrition in the sample over time at a rate of about 5%.
Households were replaced in some cases as well so that the two samples do not constitute an exact panel . 
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Using firm-level data
An alternative approach to the problem considered above is to contrast the predictions of
efficiency wage models with  models of bargaining  using firm-level data.  Wadhwani and Wall
(1991) provide an example of this approach.  It begins by specifying a standard Cobb-Douglas
production function, augmented by relative wages and unemployment to test the predictions of
efficiency wage models.  If effort, assumed to be linearly related to the log of relative wages,
obtains a coefficient equal to that on (ln) employment, the Solow condition of unit effort
elasticity obtains, but more generally, if wages are the subject of a bargain but efficiency wage
considerations matter nevertheless, the effort-wage elasticity will be less than one (see Layard
et al., 1991).  The difficulty with testing this model is that a positive association between relative
wages and productivity in these models may arise because of simultaneity bias, due for instance,
to workers driving a bargain with employers to share rents so that high productivity raises the
pressure for high wages to be paid.  This is usually dealt with by suitably instrumenting for
relative wages in the empirical specification and whether the argument is persuasive then depends
greatly on the choice of instruments.  This is also the route pursued here.  While the data on wage
premiums can only be suggestive about the importance of efficiency wage effects, if the firm-
level evidence is also supportive, the test is on stronger ground.
The data
The data are culled from two panel surveys: the first, of 1500 households, conducted in the seven
largest towns in Ethiopia in November 1994
9, and surveyed again in February 1997, about two
years later - and the second, a survey of 220 firms in the manufacturing sector in Addis Ababa,
surveyed in 1994 and 1995.  The first set of tables presents summary statistics using the
household survey.  Table 1 presents data on activity and real wages, using the entire sample of
men between 15 and 64, for 1994 and 1997
10. The table describes the sectoral allocation of the
sample and the labour force by public, private or self employment - or unemployment.  The
public sector consists of civil servants and those employed in public sector enterprises or local
government.  The private sector is a heterogenous category: it includes the larger private
enterprises, international organisations and a few cooperatives, as well as casual workers and
domestic workers - the last category being entirely occupied by women.  Own account and family
workers and employers comprise the self-employed.  Together with the unemployed, the four
groups comprise the labour force.
Reported unemployment is high: it was about 34 percent in 1994 and 28 percent in 1997. The
unemployment rate is calculated as the number of persons who reported themselves as being out
of work and currently looking for work, expressed as a percentage of the labour force.  The
International Labour Organisation defines the unemployed as those who have not been in work
in the previous week and have looked for work in that period.  The figures reported here are not
with reference to any period: consequently, they might be an overestimate of the current11Note that the latter survey finds a much lower overall urban unemployment rate (13 percent), but this is
entirely due to the different sampling: the survey used in this paper only covered the seven largest towns, while the
Central Statistical Authority’s sample includes all small towns in its sampling frame, resulting in the majority of
the sample coming from  these smaller urban areas, where unemployment is rather low. In this survey, the sample
is self-weighting so the individuals come predominantly from Addis Ababa.
12Most workers reported their wages per month and the data on hours worked was obtained separately.
The data on hours is, as always, prone to errors in measurement.  Furthermore, most wage workers work a standard
week and there is little variation in hours.  Hence, it was decided that monthly wages ought to be the measure relied
on in this study.
13This surprising result is not just a consequence of the sampling. Preliminary results of the the 1995/96
Welfare Monitoring Survey of the Central Statistical Authority reveals similar results: secondary school leavers
have an unemployment rate more than three times the average unemployment rate; sixty percent of the unemployed
are children of a household head, living at home with the latter; another twenty percent are relatives of a head. Only
15 percent of the unemployed are household heads.
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unemployment rate as usually defined.  However, the 1994 Census (Central Statistical Authority
(1997)) reports the unemployment rate in Addis Ababa (the capital), as 35% on average for both
sexes which is in line with the figures in Table 1. Similarly, preliminary results from the Welfare
Monitoring Survey of 1995/96 conducted by the Central Statistical Authority suggested male
unemployment in Addis Ababa of about 28 percent
11.
The second part of the table provides summary data on monthly wages for formal wage work and
an estimate of earnings in self employment.  Incomes, apart from wages, were collected at the
household level and cannot be readily attributed to particular household members.  The figures
reported are therefore total household income from family business activities divided by the
number of family members involved in such activities. The median income is reported to avoid
the problem of outliers.  All earnings are in 1990 prices, deflated by the CPI as calculated for
urban Ethiopia by the Central Statistical Office.  On average, monthly wages
12 increased over this
period.  Public sector pay scales were revised upwards in 1995 and men in the public sector
received an average real increase in wages of 17% while men in the private sector saw their
wages rise by about 7%.  This conceals the substantial differences by level of education and type
of employment, of which more in Table 2. Tables 2  and 3 provide the breakdown of employment
and wages in each sector by education (for men).  Clearly, the private sector offers higher wages
on average to all groups except those with secondary education, but in the aggregate, the average
wage is higher in the public sector simply because more of the secondary and tertiary educated
are to be found there.  Table 3 also provides the distribution of the unemployed by education and
this is most revealing.  The largest group, over half of the unemployed, are secondary school
leavers,  followed by those who have completed primary school. The table shows that 54 percent
of those with completed secondary education were unemployed in 1994; a quarter of those with
complete primary education were also unemployed as were a fifth of the unskilled and tertiary
educated. There was some decline in these rates by 1997, although levels remained high
13.  It is
expected therefore that the empirical tests of premiums would in turn reveal the variation by
unemployment rates in each of these groups.  
The descriptive statistics on some of the characteristics of the unemployed and those in work,
together with information on their family background are also revealing.  It is clear that the
unemployed seem to come from families that are well educated on average; 45% of their mothers
have had some education as compared with 15% of those who are self-employed.  They also
come from relatively better-off households as about 52% of them live in their own home-14The main ethnic groups in Ethiopia are the Amhara (who also wielded political power before 1992 and
the current government), the Tigray (who form the bulk of the present government) and the Oromo.
15One explanation is that there is some cost in terms of finding formal wage employment in the future. The
unemployed are also overwhelmingly the higher-skilled and this might suggest that they are attempting to signal
their higher productivity to wage employers or their commitment to invest in on-the job-skills- but since education
levels are readily observable, it is unclear why such signalling would have to be undertaken while remaining
unemployed. Another possible explanation might be barriers to entry in self-employment; however, it appears that
the unemployed are less likely to be liquidity-constrained for instance.  The barriers might take the form of social
and ethnic networks to which some groups are denied entry.  I attempt (without formally testing these hypotheses),
to introduce proxies for these variables in the estimation of the model of allocation into sectors. 
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compared with 39% for those in the private sector or self employment. They are similar to those
in the public sector in terms of ethnic background for over half are Amhara
14.  Public sector
workers also come from families with relatively better educated parents (and the younger cohort
of public sector workers is very similar in profile to the unemployed, particularly in terms of
background). Perhaps the one distinguishing feature of the self-employed is that a larger
percentage are Gurage; the Amhara are less likely to be in this sector relative to being
unemployed or in wage work.  
Table 1:  Unemployment and Employment for men in urban Ethiopia: 1994-1997
1994 1997
Allocation (%)
Unemployment (% of labour force) 33.8 27.7
Public sector (% of labour force) 26.4 29.3
Private sector (% of labour force) 21.0 25.0
Self-employment  (% of labour force) 18.8 18.0
Participation rate (as % of sample) 68.3 62.7
Earnings (Birr)
Median revenues per family worker in self-employment (1990 prices) 258 113
Monthly wages public sector (in 1990 prices) 247 287
Monthly wages private sector (in 1990 prices) 230 246
Source:  Ethiopian Urban Household Survey.
Table 3 summarises the information on the support and job expectations of the unemployed: most
of them rely on parental support while unemployed - only 16 percent admit to taking up casual
jobs to support themselves while unemployed.  It might be argued that the self-employed are
those who simply cannot afford to be unemployed for any length. However, it is unclear why
those in the unemployment queue do not choose to engage in some sort of activity, however petty
to support themselves
15. They also reveal a preference for finding work in the public sector -
about half say they are looking for work in the public sector while only 22 percent state a
preference for work in the private sector.  The dominance of the public sector both in the
aspiration of workers and in reality is a justification for the model in Section 2 and hence13
predicted reservation wages of those in private work depend in large part on wages paid in the
public sector.










1994 1997 1994 1997 1994 1997 1994 1997
Allocation (%)
Unemployed 19.1 15.5 23.1 30.7 56.6 46.4 18.4 17.3
Public Sector 16.4 18.1 28.1 24.3 23.9 30.0 59.2 58.1
Private Sector 26.3 27.4 28.8 25.6 12.0 14.0 14.6 15.1
Self employed 38.3 39.0 20.1 19.4 7.6 9.5 7.8 9.5
Earnings (birr)
Reservation wages of unemployed 107 93 117 212
Public sector wages 137 231 165 210 231 257 377 415
Private sector wages 183 209 190 204 187 291 566 513
Source: Ethiopian Urban Household Survey
Table 3: Source of support and type of job sought while unemployed
Percentage of unemployed
Source of support while unemployed
Parental help/relatives/spouse 80.8
Small occasional jobs 15.6
Previous savings/sale of assets  3.7
Type of work sought by unemployed
Public sector 47.6
Private sector 22.3
Casual work  5.6
Any work 24.5
Source:  Ethopian Urban Household Survey
A critical issue is the examination of the premiums actually obtained by those unemployed who
found work in the private sector in 1997.  Only about 18% of the unemployed found work in
1997 - and about 10% found private sector work.  The average premiums over the reservation14
wages obtained by these men was about 83% percent in the private sector and about 54% percent
in the public sector. The premiums obtained by those unemployed who found work in 1997
demonstrate that first-time workers also receive premiums.  It is striking that given the preference
of the unemployed for the better-paid public sector jobs and despite the high rates of
unemployment observed here, the percentage premiums received by those who found work in the
private sector are substantially higher than those received by public sector workers.
The final table in this section provides some summary evidence from the firm-level data about
the problems faced by employers and managers and the manner in which firms attempt to
motivate their workers to exert effort on the job (table 4).  It demonstrates the importance
attached to extracting effort on the job and that larger firms, which are less able to use personal
monitoring by the owner, are more likely to use extra payments and supervision by a
manger/foreman - and are more likely to suffer from problems such as absenteeism and lack of
effort..  Lack of effort is mentioned as a problem by over a third of medium and large firms.  The
existence of clear patterns by firm size in both the manner of supervision and the kinds of
problems reported means in turn that using firm size as a control in wage regressions captures
such variation. The last line of the table provides the median value-added by firm size
demonstrating that profitability does rise slightly with size of firm - but more convincingly, value
added per worker and value added over capital is positively correlated with the size of the firm.
This confirms the pattern and hence makes easier the interpretation of the controls for firm size
in wage regressions that use household-level data.  In order to be able to check for consistency
across both household and firm-level data, the measures used of firm-size, sector occupation and
education group are the same.
Table 4:  Evidence from firm-level survey of manufacturing enterprises  in  1994:













How is effort at work ensured?
(% answering yes)
supervision by foreman 14.0 27.1  51.0  57.0 
pay piece rate 49.2 29.4  39.4  57.1 
other payment 14.2 21.6  24.6  42.8 
cultivate trust 38.4 44.0  46.4  43.0 
firing threat 8.8 14.6  11.8  20.0 
Problems reported 
(% answering yes)
absenteeism 31.5 38.2 36.4 57.0 
high turnover 16.6  21.6 15.6  2.5 
lack of effort 26.0  8.1 30.8  43.5 
industrial action 6.0 5.8 12.0  28.0 
Median Value added per employee
(in birr)
6330 7273 5271 7977
afirm size measured in terms of employees16This regression and all the other reduced -form wage regressions that follow include corrections for
selectivity bias obtained from estimates of allocation into public, private, self-employment and unemployment using
a multinomial-logit specification.
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4. The empirical model and its estimation
In order to test the theoretical model laid out in section 2, set out below are the elements of the
empirical model. The observed data contain observations on the reservation wage of the
unemployed in 1994 and the observed wages of those in the public and private sectors in 1994
and 1997. Furthermore, a sub-sample of those unemployed in 1994 found work in the private
sector in 1997 and this important sub-sample allows both a consistency check of the models
estimated as well as providing evidence on whether new and first-time employees also obtain
premiums.  Finally, the data on firms are used to estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglas
production function to examine the effects of wages on productivity.
Explaining the wage premium
The test for whether efficiency wages are paid in the private sector turns on whether there is
evidence of employers paying some amount over and above the reservation wage of the marginal
worker: this amount or premium being systematically related to employee productive
characteristics, group unemployment rates and local unemployment rates. This follows directly
from comparing (8) to (15) and (18): if firms pay competitive wages, then private sector labour
market equilibrium wages are equal to reservation wages. Note that the dominance of the public
sector implies that  reservation wages will reflect the going rate in the public sector and this must
be accounted for.  Therefore, controlling for worker heterogeneity in reservation wages and firm
heterogeneity in offered wages, the observed premium should be zero, or in statistical terms,
given noisy data, the premium should not be correlated to household, group or local
characteristics - it should just be white noise.
The first step involves constructing an estimate of the premium and this means constructing an
estimate of the reservation wage for those in work, since only the unemployed were asked for
their reservation wages. In order to obtain estimates of the premium, estimates of the reservation
wage of private sector workers are obtained, by using the reported reservation wages of the
unemployed to construct a prediction model. Estimates of the premium are then constructed as
the difference between accepted wages and estimated reservation wages.
 
The first step therefore is to obtain estimates of the public sector wage offer for all
workers.  If workers in this labour market form their expectations of wages based on the public
sector’s offers, this in turn determines their reservation wages.  In order to construct these
estimates the following model is estimated, where it is assumed that the logarithms of public
sector wage offers are independent draws from the normal distribution, that differ across
individuals j only in terms of their means
16.16
lnwpubj ' Xj´β % Oj´ν % uj (17)
lnwresj ' Xj´β % Zj´δ % ln ˆ wpubj´γ % vj (18)
Xj is a vector of the usual variables in a reduced-form regression of wages and includes
education, age and its square, marital status and controls for ethnicity and town of residence.  Oj
represents the occupational grade assigned to the job and is used here for two critical reasons:
first, for describing wage setting in the public sector and second, for identification of the effect
of the public sector wage offer in predicting reservation wages. In effect, the regression attempts
to identify government pay-setting rules. The use of occupational grade to serve these purposes
is possible only because the occupational grade for those in work is known while the unemployed
were asked specifically about the occupational grade they wished to join. Based on this
regression, the mean public sector wage offer is obtained for both the unemployed and private
sector workers. 
The next step is obtaining estimates of the reservation wage for all private sector workers. The
reservation wage regression on the sample of unemployed is estimated in an analogous way,
using the predicted mean public sector wage offer. 
Observed reservation wages are regressed on a series of own characteristics and proxies for
support while unemployed, the predicted mean wage offer in the public sector (lnw
^) and a
selectivity correction for being in unemployment. Note that it includes all the variables used (X)
in predicting the public sector wage offer, apart from occupational grade which makes its entry
only indirectly, through the predicted public sector wage offer. To control for the quality of the
match between employer and employee, proxies for how efficiently the unemployed hunt for
work (whether actively looking for jobs through informal means, i.e. not just depending on the
official job exchange) as is a proxy for worker heterogeneity (a variable capturing whether the
worker was promoted on the first job which might distinguish relatively high productivity
workers). This regression is then used to predict reservation wages for private sector workers. 
Finally, estimates of the premium are obtained as the difference between observed wages in the
private sector and the estimated reservation wage. This premium is regressed on levels of
education, marital status, whether head of household, whether promoted on the first job, firm
size, sector of employment and controls for ethnicity, town of residence and selectivity
correction. In the context of a shirking (or equally, a turnover model), these variables can be
supposed to capture incentives to shirk, in particular, opportunities to find a job in the public
sector if unemployed or if in the private sector (linked to group-specific and local unemployment
rates). The notion is that since some groups, like secondary school-leavers, have very high
unemployment rates, this in turn ought to lower their premiums. Some characteristics, such as
being head of a household or being married), might have good prospects in both the public sector17It might also be the case that such workers have lower reservation wages since they have an incentive
to leave unemployment sooner and support the household - it would be difficult to distinguish such effects.
18In doing so, I  assume that the coefficients of the reservation wage regression in 1994 apply to 1997 as
well. Mean wage offers in 1997 are updated, however, using the characteristics of workers in 1997. The
specification used is as follows: 
Premium97 - Premium94 = (θj - θj) + (α 97 - α 94) Vj + (e97 - e94), where the first term vanishes, eliminating the fixed
effects and the second term captures the effects of changes in coefficients over the two periods. Note that the
variables used in both regressions are the same across periods since they consist of own characteristics and firm
effects, which remain the same since workers in the panel used here do not change firms in this period.
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and elsewhere: firms may wish to retain such employees
17. Local labour market conditions, such
as local unemployment rates and public sector opportunities, are also likely to matter and are
controlled for by town fixed effects. The variable, whether promoted on the first job, can be seen
as proxying more productive workers. While reservation wages might already control for this
characteristic, to the extent that it is differently valued by the firm, the suggestion is that the firm
will have incentives to keep these high productivity workers, who are likely to have more
opportunities to find lucrative alternatives.
Heterogeneity in worker quality and its effects on the premium
One potential weakness of this exercise is the fact that the premium thus estimated may be
picking up rewards to unobserved ability or quality of workers or even some firm-specific effect
associated with the firm that employs them. After all, firms do interview potential workers and
attempt to choose the best. In order to counter this criticism, estimates of the premium in 1997
for the same sample are obtained (and this includes only workers who stayed in the same firm
over this period) and a regression on the differenced variables estimated in order to eliminate
unobserved individual fixed effects from the regression
18. If pay is linked to efficiency wage
incentives, for instance, then by 1997 changing circumstances in the labour market (such as
changed unemployment rates) would imply different coefficients for the premium regression.
Therefore, the differenced regression will still include the same variables as in the level equation.
The coefficients now measure the changes in the coefficients between 1994 and 1997. If the
differences in coefficients in the fixed effects premium regressions are similar to those in the
separate regressions, then it might be argued that unobserved ability is not the main explanation
for the existence of the premiums.  As a final (and perhaps the most persuasive) test of the
consistency of the results, I  run the regression on the actual premium earned in 1997 on a sub-
sample of  who were unemployed in 1994 and who found jobs in the private sector in 1997.  The
sample is small but the premiums obtained here are actual premiums obtained rather than
estimates and if the results here are similar to those for the regression of predicted premiums in
1997, the results are undoubtedly on stronger ground.  Furthermore, if it is clear that new workers
do obtain premiums (recall that the average premium is 83% percent), then models of specific
investments are ruled out.
Firm-level regression
Finally, the firm-level data is used to examine the effects of high relative wages on productivity.
A key prediction of efficiency wage theories is that wage increases pay for themselves since they
act as an incentive to increased effort.  If so, a higher relative wage at any firm (relative to other18
lnYit ' lnAi % βlnLit % βγln( w




firms in that industry) should make relatively more productive.  The specification is similar to
that of Wadhwani and Wall (1991) and Machin et al (1992).  Value-added in a firm is determined
by a Cobb-Douglas production function:
where Yit denotes value added and the subscripts denote firm i in period t, Ki t is capital stock,
Lit is employment and A denotes fixed effects that affect productivity.  If efficiency wages matter,
this specification should be augmented by some function that determines effort on the job.  In
order to do so, the simple specification where effort is allowed to affect L is used (though in
practice this is easy to relax so that it might affect returns to labour, β) - so that the production
function uses an augmented labour input given by (ei Li t) 
β.  Assume that effort, denoted by e, is
a  function of relative wages.
Let ei = b(wi /w
*)
γ where w is the wage offered by the firm and w
* is the average wage available
at other firms.  Substituting the augmented labour input and taking logarithms obtains the
empirical specification to be estimated.
In this simple model, if relative wages affect profit, profit maximisation requires that the
elasticity of wages with respect to effort be 1 so that γ = 1 and the coefficient on relative wages
is equal to that on the labour input.  However, if wages and employment are the object of a
bargain between workers and employers (rather than being entirely determined by efficiency
wages), the effort wage elasticity is likely to be less than one (see Layard et al., 1991).
In short, a significant effect of relative wages on value added would be evidence in favour of
efficiency wages - but an elasticity less than one would not rule out bargaining over wages as
well.
The main issue in the estimation of the model in Equation (22) is the possibility that high
productivity actually drives wage demands so that the estimates suffer from simultaneity bias.
This is an issue if insider effects actually determine wages- and hence testing the model is fraught
because all appearance of such bias must be eliminated in order to persuade one of the
importance of efficiency wages in wage determination. Therefore, it is vital to check whether
relative wages are endogenous and if so, to find suitable instruments to obtain consistent
estimates of the parameters.  Since data on  two years (1994  and 1995) were available, the value-
added in 1995 was regressed on relative wages, capital stock  and employment in 1995 and
lagged values of all these variables used as instruments.
The instruments used for the measure of relative wages include the dummy variables measuring
whether firms used different kinds of supervision, whether they use a firing threat and whether
they thought that instilling trust in workers was important and whether  employees were found
through relatives and friends.  Other instruments include the value of investment undertaken over
the previous five years and the age of the firm. (These were also used as direct regressors but19Unfortunately, a regression in first differences does not allow  testing the hypothesis proposed here since
data realtive wages changed little between the two years. Note that eliminating unobserved firm-level effects such
as unobserved quality of workers also helps eliminate another contender in explaining why high relative wages
might raise the productivity of a firm - which cannot be done here.  However, assuming that relative wages have
changed little between years and examining the regression in first differences obtains similar coefficients. 
20For the unemployed, it is clear that it is high reservation wages that determine allocation. Living with
parents and receiving support in the form of remittances are positively related to being unemployed. Self-
employment is mainly associated with ethnicity (being Gurage), a larger family size and lower skill levels on
average.Education seems to have a substantial effect on allocation. Secondary and tertiary education have large and
significant effects on entry into the public sector.  Those with secondary education also have a high probability of
being unemployed: having secondary education increases the marginal probability of being unemployed by about
19%.  Tertiary education is associated with a lower probability of being unemployed in 1994 - but by 1997, this is
reversed, which is consistent with the removal of guarantees of employment in the public sector for this group. The
educated are less likely to be in the private sector and self-employment. Primary and secondary education reduces
the probability of being in the private sector by 9 to 22 percentage points in this period; similar percentages apply
for self-employment. The association of  unemployment with  secondary school education may well be a recent
phenomenon, linked to the reforms. A previous paper, focusing on the young between 1990 to 1997 sheds some
light on this. Reforms since 1991 do not appear to have resulted in an increased absorption of skilled workers into
the private sector or self-employment. The retrenchment since 1990 and the reduced recruitment of the secondary-
and tertiary- educated by the public sector has resulted in a substantial rise in unemployment among the educated
(Krishnan, Tesfayi and Dercon (1997)). 
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proved to have little effect).  Note that one difficulty with this procedure is that firm-specific
fixed effects have not been eliminated and in order to control for this to some degree, dummies
for sector were used
19.  None of the firms report any union threat or indeed that any fraction of
the firms’ labour force was unionised. 
5. Results
A multinomial-logit model of allocation into wage work, self-employment and unemployment
was estimated and the selectivity corrections retained to correct the estimated equations (19) and
(20), as well as the reduced form regressions on the estimated premiums in the private sector
20.
In order to obtain estimates of the private sector premium, it was necessary to predict both the
wages in the public sector and the reservation wages (itself a function of the predicted public
sector wage), for private sector workers.  Table 5 presents the wage regression for the public
sector in 1994.  The regressors include occupational grade (professional, clerk or skilled - the
base group being the unskilled), in order to describe public sector wage-setting rules.  It also
serves to identify the public sector wage in the regression of reservation wages since occupational
grade cannot be thought to affect reservation wages directly.  Occupational grades are strongly
significant in determining wages, even after controlling for education, age and other
characteristics. Returns to education are large, particularly for those with tertiary education - and
the fit of the regression is good with an adjusted R
2 of 0.57.
 Table 5 also provides the estimated reservation wage regression on the sample of unemployed.
This regression contains all the variables included in the allocation function but also includes,
three others: the predicted public sector wage offer, the manner of job search and whether the
person was promoted on the first job.  The predicted wage offer dominates the regression with20
a large and significant coefficient of 0.70.  It also drowns out the effect of most of the other
variables in the regression apart from mother’s education and the town of residence.  The last set
of variables might be thought to suggest that, controlling for education, those in the capital Addis
Ababa, have higher reservation wages on average.
The predicted reservation wage is used to estimate the premiums paid in the private sector and
to ask whether such premiums if observed are systematically related to the likelihood of shirking
on the job.  But before doing so, it might be useful to ask precisely how meaningful the predicted
reservation wages might be; for instance, do they have a relationship with observed wages that
is consistent with standard models of job allocation?  If yes, observed wages and reservation
wages ought to be positively correlated.  Reservation wages were included in a standard
regression of private sector wages and have a coefficient of .92 (not significantly different from
1) which is reassuring.
The behaviour of the wage premium
Table 6 presents estimates of the regression of the premium paid in 1994.  The average premium
(as a percentage of actual wages) is about 0.26 and the distribution is slightly positively skewed.
The  regression includes the regressors, whether head of the household, education, whether
promoted on first job, ethnicity and town of residence.  If the characteristics adequately reflect
the likelihood of shirking for these groups (for instance, shirking might be higher where local
unemployment rates are low for the particular educational or skill category), and they are
significant in determining the size of the premiums, one might have evidence in support of an
efficiency wage model.  
But before taking that leap in interpreting the coefficients, there are a number of concerns that
must be addressed.  Perhaps the most important is whether the premiums merely reflect some
aspect of the match between employer and employee that cannot be accounted for by employee
characteristics alone.  One obvious candidate is the size of the firm and the sector to which it
belongs. As the evidence at the firm level indicates, profitability and techniques for disciplining
workers vary with the size of the firm and therefore, using both firm size and sector of
employment captures the value of the match sensibly enough. As it turns out, sectoral dummies
and in some cases firm size are significant in determining the premium, but they have little
impact on the size and significance of the other variables. 
Yet another concern is that the firm pays the marginal worker his reservation wage - but other
workers may well receive wages in excess of their reservation wages.  Put another way, if
reservation wages differ at the margin, perhaps because of differences in assets or support, the
observed premiums may simply reflect this dispersion in reservation wages.  Again, in order to
control for this,  proxies for assets are included. (Controls such as being head of household are
an attempt to pick up such an effect - however, it is difficult to distinguish between their role in
measuring commitment on the job for instance, that might raise the offered wage and their effect
reservation wages) The regression demonstrates the impact of including the variable, whether
living with parents.  Other variables (such as whether the household owns their home and the
quality of housing) were also used - and other possibilities such as total value of assets owned
were also included.  They have little effect on the premiums. The key point here is the effect of
education on the premiums. Since different educational groups face very different rates of21
unemployment as demonstrated in Table 2, and secondary school leavers face particularly high
unemployment rates, one would expect that this group would also see the lowest premiums.  
Table 5: Prediction of public sector wage offer and reservation wages
Ln (public sector wages)  Ln (reported reservation wage)
Variables Coefficient p value Coefficient p value
Age  0.08 0.01  0.02 0.46
Age squared -0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.35
Primary  0.21 0.03 -0.17   0.32
Secondary   0.62 0.00 -0.29 0.25
Tertiary  1.03 0.00 -0.12 0.60
Whether head  0.16 0.06  0.28 0.38
Professional  0.40 0.00
Clerical  0.08 0.47
Skilled  0.37 0.00
Household size -0.16 0.15
Number of children  0.00 0.95
Ln (BMI)  0.47 0.20
Live at home  0.01 0.90
Size of house  0.07 0.02
Father’s education -0.07 0.69
Mother’s education  0.11 0.13
Whether promoted on first
job
-0.04 0.84
Look for job through friends -0.07 0.14
Predicted wage offer  0.68 0.00
Sample size 354 414
Adjusted R
2 0.57 0.33
Regression include controls for ethnicity, town of residence and selection
The regression of the premium was re-estimated on the sample in 1997 (using the coefficients
from the reservation wage regression for 1994 but updating all the variables, including the mean
wage offer from the public sector).  This regression suggests that the effects of the characteristics
had changed - and the premiums received by primary school leavers in particular, have fallen.
Furthermore, there is a shift in the fortunes of the Amhara (the dominant political group until
1992), in favour of the Tigray - so that their premiums have fallen.  These effects are displayed
in Table 6.  This table also compares these results with that of the sub-sample of unemployed in
1994 who entered work in 1997.  Finally, as a test of robustness of the change in coefficients
between 1994 and 1997 (and to examine the effects of omitted heterogeneity), the panel estimates
of the changes in coefficients is presented.22
Table 6: Regression on premiums obtained in 1994 and 1997
premium in 1994 premium in 1997 premium in 1997 for sub-
sample of new entrants
change in premium (1997-1994) =
 (θj - θj) + (α 97 - α 94) Vj + (e97 - e94)
Controls for omitted fixed effects
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient P-value
Constant -0.51 0.02 -0.19 0.56 -0.82 0.21 -0.93 0.17
Head -0.29 0.01 -0.07 0.61 -0.38 0.14 0.38 0.10
Live at home -0.04 0.74 -0.09 0.46 -0.09 0.60 -0.57 0.01
Age 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.98
Primary 0.18 0.09 -0.22 0.05 -0.49 0.04 -0.52 0.00
Secondary -0.01 0.93 -0.19 0.29 -0.38 0.29 -0.33 0.22
Tertiary 0.15 0.30 -0.11 0.60 -0.40 0.33 -0.02 0.95
Amhara 0.18 0.02 -0.13 0.18 -0.20 0.14 0.03 0.85
Tigray -0.06 0.69 0.15 0.38 0.62 0.00
Promoted on first job 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.06 0.71
Micro firm -0.12 0.19 0.03 0.80 0.36 0.03 0.25 0.09
Small firm -0.09 0.39 0.01 0.94 0.31 0.19 0.58 0.00
Medium firm -0.09 0.48 0.13 0.30 0.39 0.06 0.25 0.24
Service sector 0.04 0.71 -0.20 0.08 -0.42 0.03 -0.01 0.96
Construction -0.16 0.13 -0.02 0.89 0.31 0.11 0.01 0.97
Transport 0.08 0.43 0.34 0.02 0.42 0.04 0.09 0.64
sample size 232 202 48 100
adjusted R
2 0.56 0.16 0.12 0.31
Regressions include controls for town, and selectivity correction. Omitted sector is manufacturing.21Sixty one of those unemployed in 1994 found employment in the private sector in 1997.  However, about
13 had missing information on either reservation wages or actual wages; a further 11 did not provide information
on the size of the firm in which they found employment.  The equation was specified with fewer regressors since
the degrees of freedom are small and some of the variables (like the dummies for Bahr Dar and Dessie, two of the
towns) had no variation.
22Some of the variables like whether Tigray and whether promoted on the first job (none of the sample had
been previously employed) had little variation in such a small sample and could not be used.
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The heterogeneity in reservation wages and quality of workers
A critical issue is that the dispersion in wages is due to omitted worker heterogeneity, not
measured in either predicted reservation wages or in the regression of the premium.  The final
check was to use the panel of observations with complete information on all the variables (a
sample of 100 workers) and run a regression on the differences in predicted premiums, retaining
the same variables as regressors.  The purpose of the exercise was to ask whether the changes in
coefficients observed in the differenced regression were similar to the differences obtained when
comparing the regressions in 1994 and 1997 (see Table 6). This does appear to be the case,
suggesting that omitted heterogeneity is not a factor.  Note that, in particular, the fall in returns
to workers with primary education and to the Amhara is of a similar order of magnitude as in the
two separate regressions for 1994 and 1997.
As in firm-level tests for efficiency wages, the possibility that rent-sharing drives the results
remains an issue. The regression on differences also offers estimates of the differences in
premiums between 1994 and 1997,  for workers who remained in the same firm over the two
years.  This obviously removes any fixed effects specific to the firm and worker - which in turn
should eliminate any effect that captures the unobserved bargain.  If firm-specific effects (and by
extension, rents) are not important, the coefficients should be similar to those obtained by
differencing the coefficients in the regressions between 1994 and 1997.  Therefore, the robustness
of the regressions to omitted fixed effects (whether firm-level or worker) is certainly support of
both the existence of non-competitive premiums and reasons other than rent-sharing in obtaining
the premiums.
The argument could be made that the reason premiums are observed is that the unemployed seem
to place a lower value on their endowments than do employers.  For instance, in the case of the
variable, whether promoted on the first job, the coefficient is insignificant (and negative) in the
reservation wage regression but strongly positive and significant (if weakly) in the regression of
the premium.  This suggests that if a worker was in employment and then languishes in
unemployment for some length of time, he may well mark down his expected wage.  It might also
indicate that the unemployed are very different from those in employment and the employed are
able to strike up a better bargain than the unemployed could hope for - so that reservation wages
for those in work are actually higher than that predicted here.  In short, the concern is that the
premiums observed owe a great deal to the manner of their construction - or alternatively, that
the employed are insiders driving an advantageous wage bargain. 
To address this concern, the predicted and actual premiums paid to a small group of the
unemployed
21 who found work in the private sector in 1997 were examined - the results are also
presented in Table 6.  They demonstrate that, for this sample at least, the regression estimates of
actual and predicted premiums are very similar in sign and significance
22. It is striking that the24
results using actual premiums are so similar to that obtained using the prediction model and the
estimated premiums in 1997. (The average premium predicted for this sample is actually smaller
than that actually obtained.).  I conclude from this, that the unemployed are not radically different
from the employed in the pattern of remuneration: the fact that average premiums are smaller for
this sample (whether predicted or actual), than that predicted for the full sample is more a
reflection of slack labour markets for this cohort.  Again, the similarity in sign and effect of the
premiums obtained by workers with primary and secondary education and the Amhara is
important.
Who obtains premiums?
In table 7, the actual percentage premiums over and above the reservation wage for a worker with
otherwise mean characteristics are presented for different specific characteristics. It reveals that
the premiums are lower on average for secondary school leavers - who also comprise the largest
group amongst the sample of unemployed. Primary school leavers obtain the highest premiums
in 1994, as do those with tertiary education.  Both groups have relatively lower unemployment
rates and the latter have a high chance of obtaining offers from the public sector. The premiums
are higher for those who live in the capital Addis Ababa (relative to the provincial towns), who
are Amhara and were promoted in their first job.  (The last variable must be treated circumspectly
for while it might well reflect better workers who can readily obtain offers elsewhere, it might
be best seen as a control for worker heterogeneity). It is tempting to treat  firm size as a proxy for
the ability of a firm to monitor its workers: small firms presumably can do so more readily than
big firms, where perhaps premiums are paid to persuade workers to exert effort.  However, firm
size is a veil for a variety of sins and it might be prudent to regard it as a control for the match
between worker and firm. More reassuring is the fact that the effects of worker characteristics are
robust to its inclusion.
The regression of premiums in 1997 is also related to worker characteristics but the relationship
seems to have changed with the changing labour market.  Primary school leavers now bear the
brunt of lower premiums relative to other groups and the Amhara have lost their advantage but
Addis Ababa retains hers relative to the other towns.
Finally, I turn again to the estimated premiums for the sample of 48 men who found employment
in 1997 (table 7).  This is a younger cohort that has spent longer in unemployment (for an average
of 25 months) compared with the average private sector worker (10 months). The educated have
lower premiums on average than those with less than primary education.  Again the Amharas
have lower premiums than the other ethnic groups - but consistent with the previous evidence,
those in the capital Addis Ababa, have an advantage.  Even so, it is striking that the regression
of actual premiums behaves very much like that of the predicted premiums and adds weight to
the notion that the premiums exist and have not been conjured up. In particular, it suggests that
the evidence for rent-sharing derived from specific investments is weak since new workers also
obtain premiums. 25
Table 7: Percentage premium over the reservation wage
Variable Premium in 1994
(sample - 208 workers in
private sector)
Premium in 1997








28.6 19.8  3.2
Education
Unskilled 14.5 37.8* 38.0*
Primary school 51.1* -8.1* -15.0*
Secondary school 11.0 13.6  -5.0
Tertiary 43.9* 23.4 13.8
Ethnicity
Amhara 53.3* 10.7 -14.1*
Tigray 4.5 46.9* -
Worker quality
Promoted on first job 49* 19.8* -
Firm size
Micro 18.6 19.4 2.3
Small 21.4 17.5 6.8
Medium 21.8 32.9 10.2
Town of residence
Addis Ababa 36.1* 30.3* 12.0*
(Obtained as marginal returns to particular characteristics, keeping other values at the mean of the sample)
Firm-level evidence
Finally, the examination of the regressions using data on the firm seem to back up the evidence
above since the relative wages of primary workers have a positive and significant effect on value
added while those of secondary school leavers do not.  The regressions are presented in Table 8
below. Relative wages of workers with primary education have a positive and significant effect
on value-added while the relative wages of secondary school leavers have no effect.  This is in
consonance with the evidence from the household survey in 1994, where primary school leavers
obtained the highest premiums.  Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the effort wage elasticity
is one cannot be rejected.  As a check, the unaugmented production function was also estimated
and the coefficients on employment and capital stock remained much the same, consistent with
a simple Cobb-Douglas specification.
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Table 8 :  Instrumented variable regression of value added using data on firms 
Dependent variable: ln(value added in 1995)
Coefficient p value
ln (capital stock )*  0.11 0.14
ln (employment )*  0.82 0.00
ln (relative wage for primary educated ) *  0.77 0.08
ln(relative wage of secondary school educated ) * -0.17 0.41
Adjusted R
2 for (non IV) OLS regression 0.57
Hausman test: χ
2 = 28.3 with df=5 (0.04)
Regressions include controls for sectors, age of firm and investment over the previous five years. Instruments used
in first stage regressions include controls for kind of supervision, whether piece rates used, lagged employment and
capital stock.. * denotes variables treated as endogenous.
First-stage regressions for relative wages
Ln relative primary wage ln relative secondary wage
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Ln Employment in 91 -0.35 0.13 0.18 0.76
Ln Employment in 91(squared)  0.09 0.03 -0.06 0.61
Pay piece rates  0.30 0.04 0.03 0.94
Use assembly-line supervision -0.31 0.02 0.14 0.69
Supervised personally - 0.02 0.72 0.21 0.65
Threat of being fired  0.16 0.37 0.73 0.12
Found employee through
friend/relative
0.23 0.14 0.29 0.48
Adjusted R
2 for first stage regressions: ln(rel prim wage) : 0 .16 (Note: includes other exogenous variables)
Adjusted R
2 for first stage regressions: (ln (rel wage secondary) : 0.06.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, I have taken a less than usual route to discovering whether firms pay efficiency
wages.  It is unusual because it relies on a survey of households rather than that of firms - though
the evidence is backed up by data on firms.  In doing so, it cannot avoid the problems that have
bedevilled the tests of efficiency wages, particularly the thorny issue of whether more profitable
firms pay their employees high wages as a form of rent-sharing or whether more productive
workers, who are paid to exert themselves raise the profits of firms - but it does offer evidence
that can allows different perspectives on the workings of the labour market. However, the fact
that results at the level of the firm and the evidence on wage premiums reveal a consistent
pattern, not readily explained by insider effects, is suggestive.23As Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) remark at the end of their paper, their model is most likely to apply to the
determination of wages for unskilled workers.
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Using a sample of workers in the labour force, the test uses predicted reservation wages to
construct estimates of premiums for those in employment.  I find a significant and meaningful
relationship between the premiums paid and a series of worker characteristics including education
and town of residence, controlling for firm size and heterogeneity in worker quality.  In
particular, those with primary education appear to receive the highest premiums in 1994
Furthermore, using firm level data for the same year, relative wages of  workers with primary
education seem to positively affect value-added.
The key issue is whether, in the presence of a large public sector which pays high wages, wage
premiums in the private sector are paid  as an incentive for workers to exert effort on the job.
Firms report that absenteeism and lack of effort by workers are important problems that they face.
 The premiums observed here vary with the rates of unemployment faced by groups with different
education: primary school leavers (in 1994) and the unskilled (in 1997) receive the highest
premiums
23 and faced relatively lower rates of unemployment.  The Amhara in 1994 (the
dominant political group in 1994, replaced by the Tigray in 1997), those with tertiary education
and those in the capital Addis Ababa also receive relatively higher premiums, consistent with
their higher chances of finding work in the public sector. 
Is this positive evidence of efficiency wages?  It is certainly suggestive - and a number of rival
explanations such as dispersion caused by differences in size of the firm or the dispersion in
reservation wages relative to the marginal worker, or employed insiders being able to effect
advantageous wage bargains do not seem consonant with the evidence.  The firm-level data
suggest that union pressure is not accounted important by managers in the private sector and none
of the firms have workers in unions, so  there is little evidence of the existence of insider effects.
It is possible that the dispersion in reservation wages relative to a marginal worker causes
premiums - and while various controls were tried to little effect, there may well be better
measures of assets unavailable here  to proxy this variation.  However, the similarity of results
in both the fixed-effects regression and the level regressions for 1994 and 1997 - coupled with
the fact that the actual premiums are paid to those who found employment in 1997 seems to be
evidence against it. (It is also evidence against the importance of turnover costs and specific
investments in wage determination). Unobserved variation in ability is also a possible explanation
but again, this received little support when tested against the regression in first differences using
the panel data. In sum, there does appear to be evidence of efficiency wages being paid in the
private sector of this labour market.  And while the larger question of whether this is the most
important reason for high and persistent unemployment remains open, it is striking that
unemployment rates well over 25% seem necessary before wage premiums fall.  Clearly, the
difficulties inherent in  motivating workers are critical to wage-setting in this labour market. 
Finally, it is worth drawing attention to the difficulty of taking theory to data in the context of the
standard labour market information being collected in developing countries.  As is clear from this
analysis, the usual data collected on workers and the unemployed does not allow an analyst to
distinguish between the alternatives in a straightforward way.  In particular, the concentration on
firms (and their workers) might be less useful in a world where the relatively more stable unit of
organisation is the household.  It is clear that more can be learned by expanding the household28
survey to gather more information on the firms where members of the household are employed.
This might also allow a clear comparison between the unemployed and those in work. The lesson
from this exercise is that starting from the household as the unit of analysis  to analyse the
functioning of the labour market might well be more illuminating than concentrating on the
behaviour of firms alone.
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